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THE NATURE OF LEGAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
IN WISCONSIN
The question of what body has jurisdiction over the conduct of
attorneys has been definitely answered by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.' In State v. Cannon,2 Justice Owen stated in the majority opinion: "It is not a power derived from the Constitution or statutes -of
this state. It is a power which is inherent in this court. It is a power
that inheres because attorneys at law are officers of the court. Courts
will defer to reasonable legislative regulations, but this difference is
one of comity or courtesy, rather than an acknowiledgment of power."
Justice Crownhart concurred in the result but dissented on the question of the source of jurisdiction contending that the court derives all
its power from the constitution and that it is subject to "reasonable"
regulation by the legislature. In other jurisdictions it is. uniformly
held that attorneys are officers of the'court and, as such, the court has
3
the power to admit or to disbar them.
The action by a court in disciplining an attorney is judicial in
character, but the inquiry made is in the nature of an investigation by
the court into the conduct of one of its own officers, and is not the
trial of an action or a suit, the order entered being but an exercise
of the disciplinary jurisdiction which a court has over its officers.4
Whether the statute of limitations is applicable in such a proceeding and whether a prior convictioji can be relied upon to sustain on
allegation upon a ground of res adjudicata, are two procedural questions which should be answered at the outset.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has definitely answered the former
in State v. Haggerty5 where it held that;
"The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, nor does the circumstance that the facts
set up as a ground for disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by limitations, affect the disbarment proceeding, except where the conviction of the crime for which the revocation of the attorney's
license is asked is a necessary pre-requisite. However, proceedings instituted after a great lapse of time from the commission of the act complained of are regarded with disfavor,
and the court may refuse to hear an application to disbar that
has been unreasonably delayed."
On the question of the applicability of the doctrine of res adjudicata
' State v. Richter, 187 Wis. 490, 204 N.W. 492 (1925) ; In re Stolen, 193 Wis.
602, 214 N.W. 397 (1927) ; In re Rubln, 194 Wis. 207, 216 N.W. 513 (1927).
2 196 Wis. 534, 221 N.W. 603 (1928).
3 DRIN]K)PE
LE .AL ETHIcs 42 (1953).
4 Am. Jun. §287; In re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379 (1927).
5 241 Wis. 486, 6 N.W. 2d 203 (1942); 5 Am. Jun. §288; 2 THORTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW, §880.
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to disciplinary proceedings it has been held in the companion cases of
State v. O'Leary and Sullivan that :"
"A judgement of conviction cannot be urged to be conclusive
against an attorney upon any ground of res adjudicata, even
though the judgment has been rendered -by a court of the same
sovereignity. To hold otherwise would be virtually equivalent
to making the conviction of crime involving moral turpitude an
independent cause for disbarment. The legislature has not done
this, and the court is of the opinion that such a rule is too
stringent."
Here, "the sole inquiry is the moral character of the defendants.
Neither their acquittal nor their conviction closes this inquiry."
It is noteworthy that, although the court does not specifically mention it, the obvious reason for denying the application of the doctrine
of res adjudicata is that in a criminal prosecution and a disciplinary
action neither the same parties nor their privies are involved.
If such a conviction is not conclusive, as we have seen it is not,
what, then, is its effect upon the disciplinary proceedings? In the same
case 7 the court held: "It is our conclusion that evidence of a conviction which stands unreversed, and which involves the solemn finding
of a jury and the judgment of a court, that defendant has been guilty
of acts involving such moral turpitude as to indicate his unworthiness
to continue as a member of the bar, is not merely evidence of his guilt
and his unfitness to practice law, but that prima facie it establishes
both facts."
A recent and graphic example of the application of the rules
stated in the O'Leary-Sullivan Case is to be found in State v. McKinnon8 where it was held that conduct of an attorney in respect to
delay in filing his income tax returns and paying his taxes for ten
years was not justified and censurable, but that they were of a personal, not a professional, character and did not sustain a negative
answer to the question of whether it is in the public interest to permit him to continue to practice law.
The court stated that, although the defendant's conduct showed
an inexcusable lack of moral sense regarding the discharge of his obligations to the government, the conduct was not grounds for disbarment since it had no relation to his duties and obligations as a lawyer,
and since the proceeding was not based upon acts involving moral
turpitude.
The question was whether the defendant's payment of double taxes
under 71.11 (6) Wisconsin Stats., where he was found to have in6207 Wis. 297, 241 N.W. 621 (1932).
7Ibid. at 300.
8263 Wis. 413, 57 N.W. 2d 404 (1953).
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tended to defeat the assessment and collection of taxes9 established a
prima facie case of conduct involving moral turpitude.
In answering that question the court pointed out that in the tax
assessment case, although no intent on the part of the defendant was
proved, it 'had been assumed from the consequence of his failures in
order that the defendant should not escape his lawful responsibility
by an interpretation of the word "defeat" which "would make useless
important processes of law in taxation matters. .. . In that case his
'reasons' for lack of attention to tax responsibilities had not the weight
of evidence sufficient to excuse him from the application of the statute."
In the disciplinary proceeding, however, the court said that the
question was whether the facts surrounding his failure to file establish
actual intent and moral turpitude. In.support of its negative reply to
the query, the court cited the fact that, during the period of the defendant's delinquency, he frequently admitted to tax authorities that
he knew that he had taxable income in all those years; that he did not
destroy any of his records, checks, bills, receipts, or books, but rather
had all of these available to himself and the tax authorities, and that,
at no time, was it found either by the Supreme Court or the Circuit
Court, that fraud or deception was involved in the defendant's failure
to file.
Having considered the peculiar nature of the disciplinary proceeding in regard to the jurisdiction of the courts, and the applicability of the statutes of limitations and the docrine of res adjudicata, it
is now necessary to realize that these proceedings are concerned with
the primary question of whether the attorney's conduct has shown him
to be of such a character that to allow him to continue in the practice
of law would jeopardize the public's interest in the proper administration of justice.10 The precise inquiry into the public interest grows out
of the unique position of trust and confidence held by the attorney
which makes him accountable in trust both to the courts and to the
public which depends upon him in his professional capacity. "A license
to practice law or any profession ought, by its very nature, to be an assurance of the moral fitness and professional competency of the licensee upon which those seeking his services may rely."' 1
If, then, the lawyer's position is one of trust,' 2 what type of moral
conduct is absolutely required of him? The Wisconsin court attempted
9 McKinnon v. Dep't of Taxation, 261 Wis. 564, 53 N.W. 2d 169 (1952).
10 State v. Schnorenberg, 208 Wis. 595, 243 N.W. 486 (1932).
11 State v. Barto, 202 Wis. 345, 232 N.W. 553 (1930).
22 "An attorney occupies a fiduciary relationship towards his client. It is one
of implicit confidence and trust." In re Law examination of 1926, 191 Wis
359, 210 N.W. 710 (1926).
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to answer this in the case of In Re Richter 3 where it cited with favor
a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Field :1'
"It is not for every moral offense which may leave a stain upon
character that courts can summon an attorney to account. Many
persons, eminent at the bar, have been chargeable with moral
delinquencies which were justly a cause of reproach to them;
some have fi-equenters of the gaming table, some have been
dissolute in their habits, some 'have been indifferent to their
pecuniary obligations, some have wasted estates in riotous
living, some have been engaged in broils and quarrels disturbing
the public peace; but for none of these things could the court
interfere and summon the attorney to answer, and, if his conduct should not be satisfactorily explained, proceed to disbar
him. It is only for that moral delinquency which consists in a
want of integrity and trustworthiness, and renders him an unsafe person to manage the legal business of others, that the
courts can interfere and summon him before them .

. He is

disbarred in such for the protection both of the court and of
the public." (emphasis supplied)
The above quoted passage very narrowly restricts the ground for
discipline to that of moral unfitness to advise and represent clients.
However, the court, in that case, although holding the above quote as
the general rule decided that an attorney who alleges in his answer,
but offers no proof, that a woman who has brought an action against
him for the value of domestic services, entered into an illegal contract
to live in illicit relations with him, and rendered services incident to
the relationship, was guilty of misconduct justifying the revocation of
his license for advancing facts prejudicial to plaintiff's honor and reputation in violation of his oath, and was wanting in good moral character.
Thus, the court, by implication at least, added a second ground
of discipline, i.e., unworthiness to continue in the legal profession,
which includes conduct Which tends to bring the legal profession and
the administration of justice into disrepute.15
Subsequent to the Richter case, supra,the Wisconsin court clarified
the general rule laid down in that case that moral unfitness to advise and represent clients is a ground for discipline 'by saying: "But
where there is lacking honesty, probity, integrity, and fidelity to trust
reposed in him, it matters not whether the lack of such virtues is revealed in transactionswith clients, in the conduct of law suits, or any
'13187 Wis. 503, 204 N.W. 492
15

(1925).

parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882).
it re Stolen, supra, n. 1; State v. Rysticken, 250 Wis. 128, 26 N.W. 2d 456
(1947); State v. Soderberg, 251 Wis. 223, 28 N.W. 2d 260 (1947). For
further graphic examples of offenses which fall into this class, see DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHics at 44.

14 EX
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other business dealings or relations. These qualities are highly essential
to the character of attorneys and judges."'6 (emphasis supplied)
More completely stated, then, the first general ground for discipline
is moral unfitness to advise and represent clients as evidenced by conduct either in a strictly professional capacity or in any other capacity.
In cases of this class, the most obvious illustration of the attorney's
lack of moral fitness is in being proven guilty of flagrant disregard of
the obligations of honesty, fidelity, candor, and fairness, which, as an
attorney, he owes to his clients and to the courts.' 7
The second general ground for discipline, i.e., unworthiness to continue in the legal profession, covers those cases in which the attorney,
although apparently one who can be trusted to deal fairly with clients,
has nevertheless done something so lacking in respect for the judicial
office or for the good name of the profession that his appearance in
court would be a scandal and contempt to the court or an outrage to
the profession.:' There are, of course, cases of misconduct which
seem to fall within both general classes. 19
613; In re 0--, 73 Wis. 619, 42 N.W. 221 (1889),
"The misconduct which will warrant suspension of an attorney is not limited

16In re Stolen, supra, n. 1 at

to acts committed strictly in -a professional character, but extends to all such
misconduct as would have prevented an admission to the bar."
17 See: Flanders et al. v. Keefe, 108 Wis. 441, 84 N.W. 878 (1901), defendant
was disbarred for making and presenting to the court affidavits known to
him to be false and for falsely pretending that he had served a notice of
appeal on the clerk when he had actually placed the notice secretly in the
clerk's files after the time had expired for such service; In re 0-, supra,
n. 16, defendant was disbarred because, after acting for a claimant in a concontest, he then instigated and conducted in behalf of another client a second contest against his former client, involving the same subject matter
and based largely upon the same facts, and in such contest testified under
oath against his former client using information acquired by means of his
first employment; State v. Stetson, 203 Wis. 657, 234 N.W. 704 (1931), disbarred for petitioning the court to admit an alleged will to probate knowing
it to be false and fraudulent document on the strength of his own perjured
testimony; State v O'Leary, State v. Sullivan, 212 Wis. 314, 249, N.W. 519
(1933), disbarred for entering into a conspiracy to bribe and for attempting
to falsify the record on their appeal from a conviction for this conduct;
State v. Baer, 228 Wis. 363, 280 N.W. 325 (1938).
But see: State v. Ballentine, 231 Wis. 127, 285 N.W. 351 (1939), where
defendant was suspended for one year for misappropriating a client's money
and wilfully misleading a court into making an appointment of him to represent two defendant's in criminal cases without disclosing his arrangement
with his clients and the fact that he had already received a part of his fee;
State v. Maclntyre, 238 Wis. 406, 298 N.W. 200 (1941), where defendant was
suspended for one year although guilty of subornation of perjury and
conspiracy to obstruct justice in preparing a verified complaint for divorce
setting forth false statements and of charging an excessive fee in settling an
estate equal to twice the amount of the services rendered.
1s See: Ex parte Wall, supra, n. 14, where defendant was disbarred for taking
an active part in the staging of a lynching in front of the court house during
the judge's lunch hour; In re Stole, supra, n. 1, where defendant was suspended for five years because, while acting as a judge of the superior court,
he borrowed money from notorious bootleggers who were later brought before his court charged with violation of the liquor laws and because he
knew the character of the persons with whom he was dealing and should

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

The specific duties and obligations as well as the proper professional demeanor of attorneys which come within the aforementioned
general grounds have at least four sources. Statutory enactments on
the subject may be found in Chapter 256, Wis. STATS., which lays
down certain minimal requirements regulating the normative behavior
of attorneys. 20 The Canons of Professional and Judicial Ethics of the
American Bar Association are a reliable guide to the practicing lawyer.
In regard to the force and effect of these Canons, although several
states have enacted them or a similar code into law,21 the Wisconsin
Statutes make no mention of them. The Wisconsin court, although not
officially adopting them as rules of court, has often cited the Canons
22
in their opinions.
The usages, customs, and practices of the bar and bench as handed
down through the common law decisions and the commentators is
undoubtedly the richest source of these duties and obligations, but are
not so readily available. 23 Finally, those basic concepts of the moral law
which guide the actions of all men are none the less applicable in
policy considerations in the field of legal ethics.2 4 It is not to be ashave known the reasons which prompted the loan; State v. Rysticken, supra,
n. 15, where an attorney was retained and paid a retainer fee by defendants
in an action, but did not serve an answer or notice of retainer, did not
learn of a default judgment against his clients until an execution had been
issued against them, neglected to get the judgment opened until too late to
do so, and neglected for two years to do anything to dispose of the judgment
in compliance with a promise made to his clients to save them harmless.
Held: suspended for two years, subject to disbarment after two years upon
failure to comply with certain conditions; State v. Soderberg, 251 Wis. 223,
28 N.W. 2d 260 (1947) ; State v. Richter, supra, n. 1.
19 See: State v. Andrews, 206 Wis. 615, 240 N.W. 147 (1932), where defendant's
course of misconduct covered a period of approximately nine years. Among
other instances, he received and converted to his own use more than $2000
belonging to an insane woman, neither returning it nor accounting to the
court for it. Held: disbarred; State v. Barto, supra n. 11, where defendant
was disbarred for filing false documents, intentionally misrepresenting the
facts to the court and clients, exacting extortionate fees, and showing professional incompetence to a degree that would have hindered admittance to
the bar, if known; State v. Bonisz, 231 Wis. 157, 285 N.W. 386 (1939).
20 In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932) "The qualifications required
of attorneys at law fixed by the legislature in order that the public interest
may be protected constitute only a minimum standard ..
21 Drinker, supra, n. 3, at 23.
22 Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 381, 161 N.W. 364 (1917); State v. Kiefer, 197
Wis. 524, 222 N.W. 795 (1929) ; State v. Ketchem, 263 Wis. 82, 56 N.W. 2d
531 (1953); State v. Kern, 203 Wis. 178, 233 N.W. 629 (1930); Hepp v.
Petrie: Appeal of Meissner, 185 Wis. 355, 200 N.W. 857 (1925) "The American Bar Association has not attempted, nor does it attempt, to legislate for
lawyers. .. ." Canons of ethics or rules governing professional conduct
among attorneys derive "such authority as they have not from the fact that
they are approved by the American Bar Association but because they are
statements of principles and rules accepted and acknowledged by reputable
attorneys wherever the common law of England obtains, and are recognized
and applied by courts in proper cases."
25 Drinker, supra, n. 3 at 22.
24 SpAuLnING, MORAL PHILOSOpHY 10 (1924); McINTYRE, UNvRsiTY OF NoTRE
DAME NATURAL LAW INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS VOL. V, (Barrett's ed. 1953).
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sumed, however, that these sources are mutually exclusive. Quite the
contrary, each overlaps generously into the other leaving relatively
few acts of conduct which have as their foundation only one particular source.

25

Having seen the general grounds for discipline which arise from
considering the principal question of whether the defendant should
be permitted in the public interest to continue the practice of law,28

we must now inquire into the importance of punishment in the view
of the courts.
"Punishment of offending attorneys is neither the primary nor the
ultimate purpose of disbarment proceedings, although it is an inevitable
incident- of a judgment of disbarment or suspension from practice,"
but "disciplinary measures should be at least co-extensive with an
effective judicial disapproval of the confessed misconduct, so that they
cannot be misunderstood or construed as an implied judicial endorse27
ment" of the erring attorney.
From this concept of the importance of punishment it can readily
be seen that to say that specific acts are grounds for commencing a
disciplinary proceeding is not to say that an attorney who is guilty
of such acts will necessarily be disbarred. An examination of the Wis"consin Supreme Court decisi6ns shows that there are three types of
punishment which have been meted out in such proceedings: first,
permanent disbarment ;28 second, temporary suspension with permission to apply for reinstatement ;29 and third, censure.30
The next question which presents itself is to determine what criteria the courts have considered in determining the type of punishment. From the opinions of the courts it may be seen that the justices
have considered either one or more of at least six factors in determining whether the punishment should be permanent disbarment, temporary suspension from practice or censure.
First, the type and seriousness of the offending conduct. If the
offense is one involving moral unfitness to advise and represent clients,
this one factor alone is usually strong enough to warrant permanent
disbarment. 3' However, this factor is not given so much weight in cases
25

Supra, n. 21.
Ex parte Wall, supra, n. 14.
State v. Kern, supra, n. 22.
28Ien re Pierce, 189 Wis. 441, 207 N.W. 966 (1926); Flanders et al v. Keefe,
State v. Stetson, and State v. Baer, supra, n. 17, State v. Soderberg supra, n.
218; State v. Andrews, supra, n. 19.
29State v. Ingram, 212 Wis. 142, 248 N.W. 915 (1933); State v. Rogers, 226
Wis. 39, 275 N.W. 910 (1937); State v. Maddock, 234-- Wis. 441, 291 N.W.
347 (1940).
30 State v. Clarke, 262 Wis. 594, 55 N.W. 2d 888 (1952); State v. Farmer, 253
Wis. 232, 33 N.W. 2d 135 (1948).
31 State v. Kern, supra, n. 22, "Bribery and attempted -bribery are indicative of
,deplorable moral turpitude on the part of offenders .The:corruption of pub2

27
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where the misconduct charged falls within the second general ground
for discipline, i.e., unworthiness to continue in the legal profession. It
is rather considered more or less on a par with the other factors in the
32

case.

Second, the effect that the punishment may have upon other attorneys with a view of stamping'out the evil. Third, the probability of
reform of the offending attorney. Since these two factors will be discussed later in this article, they will not be elaborated upon here.
Fourth, the advanced age of the attorney. In State v. Bradford3
the attorney induced a client, a guardian for minors, to loan trust
funds on inadequate security for the benefit of the attorney in reliance
on representations of personal responsibility of the attorney, who was
in straightened financial circumstances. The attorney, who was also director of a bank, was indebted to the bank in a large amount when
it closed and had participated as director in illegal extensions of large
credits to himself and to other officers and directors. The court considered the age of the defendant (72 years old) and suspended him
for two years.
Fifth, the circumstances surrounding the trying of the disciplinary
action. Illustrations of this are the attorney's subjection to a protracted trial in the disciplinary action together with the wide publicity
given to his misconduct, 34 the fact that the attorney served a jail sentence for sixty days and had virtually been out of the practice for a
year and a half,3 5 financial impoverishment and loss of practice as a
result of the disciplinary proceeding, 6 and the fact that the offense
upon which the disciplinary action was based had been committed
twenty years previously and that it was publicized to the detriment of
37
the attorney in his campaign for Circuit Judge.

Sixth, the character and professional reputation of the attorney.38
This factor is considered as evidencing the probability of reform of
the offending attorney and his fitness to advise and represent clients
inthe future.
The rather obvious weakness in this method of determining the
punishment to be exacted is the lack of certainty and uniformity which
lic officers and employees, if not unequivocally condemned and emphatically
checked, seriously imperils the safety and perpetuity of our institutions."
32 State v. Rubin, 201 Wis. 30, 229 N.W. 36 (1930).
83217 Wis. 389, 259 N.W. 101 (1935); see also State v. Ingram, supra, n. 29,
where the court considered the fact that the attorney was sixty-five years
old and in ill health as mitigating his punishment to suspension for two
years.
a4 State v. Farmer, supra, n. 30.
s5 State v. Kuenzli, 212 Wis. 296, 249 N.W. 511 (1933).
s State v. Clarke, supra, n. 30.
87 State v. Haggerty, 241 Wis. 486, 6 N.W. 2d 203 (1942).
38
State v. McKinnon, supra, n. 8; State v. Schnorenberg, supra, n. 10; State
v. Kern, supra, n. 22 .
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is necessarily incident to the exercise of such broad discretion on the
part of the court. An illustration of this may be noted from a comparison of two cases decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1929.
In State v. Kiefer 9 the attorney was charged with (1) procuring,
through his brother, Frederick Kiefer, a contract from an injured
party to prosecute the party's claim upon a contingent fee of fifty per
cent of the amount received or recorded, (2) procuring this contract
while the injured party was in the hospital suffering great bodily pain
by placing it in front of the claimant and asking him to sign, without
any explanation of the terms of the contract and without his reading
it, (3) later settling the claim for $600, $300 of Which was retained
by defendant Kiefer, and (4) negotiating the settlement hurriedly,
without any action having been instituted, and, apparently, with little
consideration given to the seriousness of the injuries.
With reference to these charges the court agreed with the referee
that the making of the contract was stibstantially as alleged, but that
there were these further mitigating circumstances: (1) that defendant
saw the claim agent twice, interviewed the claimant to get such further facts as he could, saw no opportunity to make a valid claim against
the railway company, and after some negotiation agreed on a settlement for $600, which the claimant approved; and (2) that, although
the claimant did not appreciate the meaning of the contract when he
signed it, he realized it later and accepted $300 as his share.
The attorney was further charged with having pursued, for at least
two years prior to April, 1927 (at which time the legislature enacted
sec. 256.29 making solicitations of business a ground for disbarment,
and fee-spliting a crime under sec. 256.45 of the Wisconsin Stats.),
an organized system of soliciting personal injury cases. This organized
system, in particular, follows. The defendant's brother acted as his
solicitor. The brother's business card read "Claim adjuster for the
injured," and contained the 'statement "If hurt and want damages collected, see me. No charge unless successful." In 1917 the brother copyrighted a twenty page circular, which he used in soliciting such cases,
which was intended to foment and induce litigation solely for the
profit of the solicitor and the attorney. He also used a form letter
which went to prospects, containing his picture and on the margin pictures of different accidents. The defendant knew of the methods employed by his brother to get business and occupied adjoining offices
with him with a common waiting room. The defendant paid his brother
half of his fees from the cases which the brother procured as compensation for his soliciting.
With reference to these charges, the court advanced the following
39197 Wis. 524, 222 N.W. 795 (1929).
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facts as mitigating. (1) Prior to the statutory prohibition in 1927,
such practice was the accepted custom in Milwaukee and nearly all
personal injury cases were obtained by some sort of a solicitor. (2)
When the circuit judges in State ex. rel. Reynolds v. Circuit Court0
asked for voluntary full disclosure by attorneys engaged in such practices, the defendant was the first to respond, made a frank statement of
his position, reported the cases he then had pending under such contracts, and discontinued taking cases so obtained. (3) The defendant
had a very good reputation for honesty and fair dealing with his -clients
and others.
The court held on the first count that although the defendant had
exacted an exorbitant fee, he had acted in good faith believing he was
justified in so doing in light of the prevailing practice in Milwaukee
County at that time. The recovery of the excess of a reasonable fee
was left to Milwaukee County since the claimant was a public charge.
On the second count, the court agreed with the referee that, although solicitaton and fee-splitting are "offensively unprofessional,
against public policy, in violation of good legal morals" and call for
"substantial discipline," and notwithstanding the defendant's admittedly unethical conduct in this regard, in view of the mitigating circumstances mentioned above, it could not be said that "the defendant
is of a character unfit to practice law" and that there was "no reason
''41
to question his future uprightness.
In support of their order that the defendant be suspended for
ninety days and pay the costs of the proceeding, ($391.40) the court
stated: (1) that in view of the then recent and potent influences which
were substantially stamping out the evils of "ambulance chasing," it
was not necessary to prescribe a very severe penalty on the defendant
calculated to have a deterring effect upon the profession generally; (2)
that the court was satisfied that the defendant was fully convinced of
the unprofessional conduct involved in his previous practices and that
he was not likely to resort to them again; and (3) that although punishment is neither the primary nor ultimate purpose of disbarment proceedings, the minimum punishment that could not be construed as an
implied judicial endorsement of the defendant's misconduct was the
one ordered.
Approximately six months later, the case of State v..Cannon was
decided by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.42 There it was charged that
the defendant: (1) began a personal injury action without authority
from the injured man; (2) improperly displaced attorneys previously
retained; (3) purposely and knowingly deceived courts; (4) collected
40193 Wis. 132, 214 N.W. 396 (1927).

41Supra, n.20, at 528.
42199 Wis. 401, 226 N.W. 385 (1929).
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exorbitant and unconscionable fees from his clients; and (5) commercialized his profession by the organized solicitation of business. The
court ordered the defendant suspended for two years and that he pay
the costs of the proceeding of more than $3,100 (compare to $391.40
in Kiefer case) with permission to seek reinstatement by the Supreme
Court upon good cause shown. The majority opinion per Stevens, J.
was concurred in by three other justices with Chief Justice Rosenberry and Fritz, J. taking no part and with Crownhart, J. writing a
vigorous opinion dissenting in part.
In that dissent 3 it is evident that there was serious room for doubt
as to whether the charges were amply supported by the evidence. In
the matter of beginning an action without permission from the injured
man, Crownhart, J. doubts the truth of the charge and says that, at
its worst the action was commenced through a misunderstanding and
was promptly dismissed upon the injured man's objection to its continuation. Of the two attorneys the defendant was accused of displacing, one testified that the defendant had not solicited the client
and that he had been well treated by the defendant. As for misleading
courts, the dissenter points out that the evidence was circumstantial
within which there was room for varying inferences as to the fact
and that "there is not a word in the record that he (the judge) was
deceived."
In regard to collecting exorbitant fees only two cases were charged
in both of which a legal contingent fee contract was involved, and the
only claim that the fee was exorbitant is based upon a very favorable
settlement. The dissent contends that "such a conclusion ignores entirely the basis of contingent-fee contracts" which is that the reasonableness of the fee must be judged by looking to see what the lawyer
averageson such contracts and not by singling out one fortunate settlement or verdict while ignoring the many where little or no compensation was received. In regard to solicitation, Crownhart, J. pointed
out that Cannon had not been proved guilty of any of the objectionable
methods practiced in the Kiefer case and that Kiefer was acquitted of
the charge of taking excessive fees although in one case he took a
fifty per cent fee.
The dissent further argues that there was no substantial evidence
that the defendant was dishonest or untrustworthy. In regard to punishment he adds "He has already suffered much. His character has
been falsely assailed, as the referee has found. Some of the charges
were grossly libelous, but by being given judicial dignity they were
accorded the freedom of the press, and were published broadcast ....
Not only has he paid the penalty for his own mistakes, but, like Kiefer,
431d. at 412.
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he has been made a vicarious sacrifice." 4 4 The dissent was necessarily
referred to at length in the Cannon case because it is only there
that one is appraised of the fact that there are any mitigating circumstances in the case.
Although the facts in the two cases are not exactly similar, they are
compared because of their proximity in time and because in both cases
the matter of punishment was influenced by the same considerations;
i.e. (1) the effect that it may have upon others with a view of stamping out the evil, (2) the probability of reform of the offending attorney, and (3) punishment. 45 In the Kiefer case, it felt that a
severe punishment would have little effect upon other attorneys with
a view of stamping out the evil and that a severe penalty was not
necessary since there was a strong probability that the defendant
would reform and not resort again to such questionable conduct; while
in the Cannon case decided only six months later and set in the identical background of the Kiefer case, the court felt that a severe penalty would do much to affect the stamping out of the evil and that the
defendant was not likely to reform.
In summary, then, we have seen that a disciplinary action is judicial
in nature and an exercise of the disciplinary jurisdiction which a court
has over its officers, that the ordinary statutes of limitations have no
application in a disciplinary proceeding, and that the doctrine of res
adjudicata is not applicable to a disciplinary proceeding even though
the judgment has been rendered by a court of the same sovereignty,
unless the judgment relied upon is a conviction which is, of itself, an
independent ground for discipline.
The protection of the public interest is the primary purpose of a
disciplinary proceeding from a consideration of which two general
grounds for commencing a disciplinary action may be deduced: (1)
moral unfitness to advise and represent clients as evidenced by the attorney's dishonest dealings with his clients, the courts, and his other
associates in whatever capacity.; and (2) unworthiness to continue in
the legal profession, which includes conduct which tends to bring the
legal profession and the administration of justice into disrepute.
Finally, the factors which the court considers in determining
whether the punishment will be permanent disbarment, temporary suspension of license, or censure are: (1) the seriousness of the offending
conduct; (2) the effect that the punishment may have upon other at44Id. at 418. See State v. Farmer, supra, n. 30, where it was held that the
attorney's subjection to a protracted trial in a disbarment proceeding together
with the wide publicity given to his misconduct, was sufficient punishment
without the imposition of further discipline for his conduct of fraudulently

procuring from opposite parties not represented by counsel written admis-

sions although no use was made of the admissions.
4 Supra, n. 39.
5
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torneys with a view of stamping out the evil; (3) the probability of
reform of the offending attorney; (4) the advanced age of the attorney; (5) the circumstances surrounding the trying of the disciplinary action; and (6) the character and professional reputation of the
attorney,
0. MIcHAE. BONAHOON

